Author: Bill Harley
Co-Authors ⁄ Presenters: Peter Gahan, Graham Sewell
Managerial Control of Work in the Private Security Industry
Managerial Control of Work in the Prviate Security Industry
Private security is an increasingly pervasive part of life across the OECD. Since the 1970s there has been massive growth in the industry (Prenzler et al 2007/8). There has, however, been remarkably little research on work and employment in security (but see Briken 2010). The little empirical evidence available suggests that while security is a very labour intensive industry, it is characterised by relatively poor working conditions, low skill levels, low pay, and low job security (ABS 2000).
Our aim in this paper is to analyse the development of managerial practices in the private security industry and investigate how they are experienced by employees. Our analysis uses data collected in the private security industry in Australia through interviews with managers and frontline security workers, and a survey of companies. We are interested in security as an industry where, on one hand, employees commonly have high levels of autonomy and where service quality is critical but, on the other hand, formal management systems are underdeveloped and working conditions appear poor. Our concern is with developing an understanding of how managers in the industry seek to exert control and elicit compliance from employees. In an industry characterised by low profit margins and a lack of highly-developed HRM systems, there would appear to be limited scope to use conventional motivational mechanisms (eg. performance-based rewards) but, at the same time, the fact that employees work independently and remotely introduces limits on direct surveillance and control.
Our research is at an early stage but it provides a number of important findings. First, although the formal skills required for security work are low and training is minimal, many security industry jobs can be seen as highly skilled. These skills, however, are commonly tacit, social and emotional. Second, much security work is indeed associated with conditions of high-autonomy, involving a good deal of decision-making discretion. Third, as one would expect in a low-margin, low-pay industry, motivation via performance-based rewards is rarely attempted. Fourth, in some instances electronic surveillance is used to monitor employee activity, but the limits to surveillance mean that employers also commonly rely on control mechanisms usually associated with ‘soft’ HRM. These typically take the form of control via social relationships, in the form of the use of peer-surveillance via teams, the attempt to generate commitment via paternalistic relations, and engagement in ‘team building’ activities. In seeking to make sense of these findings, we consider how work which is low-wage, low-skill (formally), but also involves opportunities for the exercise of discretion, has led to the development of hybrid systems of ‘hard’ (surveillance and sanctions) and ‘soft’ (use of social relationships) control in the security industry.
References
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2000) Security Services: Australia, Canberra: ABS.
Briken, K. (2010) Producing Insecurities: Security Work and Labour Precarization, ISA World Congress, Gothenburg.
Prenzler, T., R. Sarre and K. Earlett, (2007/8) ‘Developments in the Australian Private Security Industry’, Flinders Journal of Law Reform,10: 403-17.